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After affirming summary judgment for both hospitals, the Fourth Circuit
found it axiomatic that the parent corporations of the hospitals were not
liable, and it affirmed summary judgment in their favor.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Baber is in accord with the
decisions of other jurisdictions.5 1 5 The court's holding further strengthens
current case law by declining to judicially expand the Act's protections and
instead promoting a strict adherence to the statutory language of the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.
L. INDEMNiTY
IMWA Equities IX Co. v. WBC Associates
961 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1992)
The longstanding general rule developed at common law is that until the
business of a partnership is wound up and the accounts are finally settled,
an action on a claim arising out of the partnership transactions will not
lie. 51 6 This rule applies even after dissolution of the partnership.51 7 Subject
to well-recognized exceptions, the general rule is, however, far from abso-
515. See supra note 500 and accompanying text (giving cases from other jurisdictions in
accord with Baber). The Baber court notes one disparity between these opinions in footnote 8
of its opinion. Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 880 n.8 (4th Cir. 1992).
Specifically, the D.C. Circuit in Gatewood would impose liability on a hospital for any disparate
treatment of patients with similar symptoms, while the 6th Circuit would impose such liability
only where the hospital evidenced a bad motive in providing such disparate treatment. Id.; see
Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cleland v.
Bronson Healthcare Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Brooker v. Desert
Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying EMTALA to all patients, not just those
with insufficient resources); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Assoc., 769 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ill.
1991), appeal denied, Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Assoc., 775 F. Supp. 1159 (N.D. IlM. 1991)
(requiring actual knowledge of emergency medical condition, or failure to conduct appropriate
medical screening in order to impose liability on hospital); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp.,
727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (dismissing claim of patient who failed to show that he was
turned away for economic reasons).
516. Friedman v. Golden Arrow Films, Inc., 442 F.2d 1099, 1107-08 (2d Cir. 1971); Knapp
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 154 F.2d 395, 398 (10th Cir. 1946); Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l
Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 448, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 161 (1991); Michelsen v. Brush, 224 F. Supp. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Summerson v.
Donovan, 66 S.E. 822, 822 (Va. 1910); see also K.A. Drechsler, Annotation, Actions at Law
Between Partners and Partnerships, 168 A.L.R. 1088, 1091 (1947) (stating that rule prohibiting
partner from suing partner based on partnership agreement before winding up and settlement of
accounts is "universally accepted"); cf. Sertich v. Moorman, 783 P.2d 1199, 1205 (Ariz. 1989)
(eliminating requirement of final accounting as condition precedent to action at law between
partners or partner and partnership); Dupuis v. Becnel Co., 535 So. 2d 375, 377-78 (La. 1988)
(overruling prior cases that required final accounting or settlement prior to suit between partners).
517. See Burch v. Ashburn, 368 S.E.2d 82, 85 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that rule that
copartners cannot sue each other at law for matters arising out of partnership transactions until
after an accounting applies though dissolution has occurred); Wright v. Armwood, 107 A.2d
702, 703 (D.C. 1954) (stating that until after settlement of partnership accounts, one partner
cannot bring action at law against another partner even if partnership has already dissolved).
CASE COMMENTS
lute.518 A partnership agreement may, for example, form the basis of an
action at law where the transaction demonstrates that the partners have
agreed upon the specific sum each owes the other.519 In Wright v. Arm-
wood,520 the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that hearing a partner's claim without a formal prior accounting was proper
because the claim was for a definite amount of money and was evidenced
by a single promissory note of the partnership.5 21 Therefore, the court
reasoned that determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties
with regard to the agreement would be relatively easy. s22 In Gilbert v.
Fontaine,52 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
delineated another exception, stating that where the partnership articles
contain an express stipulation which one partner has violated, an action at
law will lie against that partner.s24 In IMWA Equities IX Co. v. WBC
Associates,5s the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether Virginia law forbids a partner's suit to enforce an
indemnity provision in a partnership agreement against another partner prior
to dissolution, winding up, and settlement of the accounts.
IMWA Equities involved a provision in a partnership agreement re-
quiring one partner to indemnify another upon the occurrence of certain
events. The question before the Fourth Circuit was whether the partner
seeking enforcement of the indemnification clause could sue once the
518. See Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1927) (recognizing that general rule
prohibiting partners from suing based on partnership transactions prior to winding up and
settlement of partnership accounts is "by no means universal, even in ordinary partnerships.");
see also Pilch v. Milikin, 19 Cal. Rptr. 334, 339 (Ct. App. 1962) (holding that general rule that
partners cannot sue based on partnership agreement prior to winding up and final accounting of
partnership is not inflexible); Wright, 107 A.2d at 703 (reaffirming that general rule barring
partner's suit against other partner arising out of partnership transactions until after winding up
and final accounting, is subject to well-recognized exceptions).
519. Summerson, 66 S.E. at 822; see also Pilch, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (holding that where
no complex accounting involving variety of partnership transactions is necessary, partner may
maintain action at law against another partner though winding up and final accounting are still
forthcoming).
520. 107 A.2d 702 (D.C. 1954).
521. Id. at 703; see also Giblin v. Anesthesiology Assocs., 567 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (App.
Div. 1991) (recognizing that although partnership has not undergone final accounting, partner
may maintain action at law against partnership when doing so requires no complex accounting);
Warren v. Warren, 784 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that final accounting
is'not prerequisite to action at law between partners where items sued on are few and simple of
solution); Hanes v. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d 801, 807 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that prior
final accounting is unnecessary for maintenance of action at law between partners based on
partnership transactions where facts are such that no complex accounting is necessary); Pilch, 19
Cal. Rptr. at 340 (holding that where no complex accounting involving variety of partnership
transactions is necessary, partner may maintain action at law against another partner though
winding up and final accounting are still forthcoming).
522. Wright v. Armwood, 107 A.2d 702, 703 (D.C. 1954).
523. 22 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1927).
524. Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1927).
525. 961 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1992).
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specified circumstances were present, even though the partners had not yet
dissolved the partnership, wound up its business, or settled its accounts.
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the indemnity provision
of the partnership agreement constituted an express stipulation, enforceable
despite the failure of the partners to dissolve, wind up, and settle the
accounts of the partnership1
26
In IMWA Equities, WBC Associates Limited Partnership (WBC) and
Porten Sullivan Corporation (PSC) co-owned Beacon Hill Farm Associates
II Limited Partnership (Beacon Hill). WBC was a Beacon Hill limited
partner, and PSC was both a general partner and a limited partner of
Beacon Hill. The general partners of WBC were James M. Wordsworth
and Harvey Borkin. After purchasing a piece of property, Beacon Hill
needed additional financing to develop the land. Consequently, it recruited
IMWA Equities IX Company, Limited Partnership (IMWA) to become its
third partner and to provide further security to Beacon Hill's lender, United
Savings Bank (USB). IMWA provided USB with a six million dollar
irrevocable letter of credit that Beacon Hill used as collateral to obtain five
and one-half million dollars in loans from USB. A provision in the amended
partnership agreement stated that any draws by Beacon Hill against the
letter of credit would become loans from IMWA to Beacon Hill. Word-
sworth and Borkin agreed to indemnify IMWA in the partnership agreement,
as protection for IMWA, PSC, and WBC.
Three years later, Beacon Hill and PSC both filed voluntary bankruptcy
petitions under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. USB
then demanded immediate payment from IMWA on the six million dollar
letter of credit. IMWA honored USB's demand, converting the letter of
credit to a loan that then became due and payable to IMWA according to
the partnership agreement. However, as Beacon Hill was in bankruptcy, it
did not repay IMWA. Moreover, WBC, Wordsworth, and Borkin subse-
quently refused to indemnify IMWA for any portion of the loan.
IMWA brought suit against WBC, Wordsworth, and Borkin in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging
breach of the partnership agreement's covenant to indemnify. The defen-
dants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the district court granted the motion, dis-
missing the case without prejudice. The district court reasoned that because
the covenant to indemnify created individual obligations within the part-
nership agreement, it was not a separate undertaking from the partnership
agreement and was therefore unenforceable absent a dissolution, an ac-
counting, and a winding up of the affairs of the partnership. The district
court denied IMWA's motioq to vacate the judgment filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
526. See Gilbert, 22 F.2d at 662 (establishing that where partnership agreement contains
"express stipulation," general rule prohibiting suits bet'Ween partners arising out of partnership
agreement prior to winding up and final accounting of firm does not apply).
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IMWA then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit initially noted that neither the Virginia
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 27 nor the Virginia Uniform
Partnership Act52 speaks to the question of whether prior to a partnership's
dissolution, winding up, and final accounting, one partner may sue another
for breaching an indemnity provision in the partnership agreement. In the
absence of any such statutory guidance, the court concluded that the rules
of equity and law should govern the case. 29 The court then recognized that
according to Summerson v. Donovan,30 the general common law rule is
that a partner cannot maintain an action at law on a claim growing out of
the partnership transactions until after a winding up and a final account-
ing. 53' The court also acknowledged, however, that the rule is not absolute,
citing Summerson for the proposition that a partnership agreement may
form the basis of an action at law where the transaction demonstrates that
the partners have agreed upon the specific sum each owes the other.532
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Summerson opinion both
reaffirmed the general common law rule-that a partner cannot sue another
partner based on the partnership transactions until the partnership is wound
up and the accounts are settled-and opened the door for exceptions to it.
The Fourth Circuit also relied on an early opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Gilbert v. Fontaine,533 in which
the court qualified the general rule, calling it "by no means universal.
534
Gilbert involved a mining partnership agreement which provided for the
periodic settlement of expenses among the partners. 51 In Gilbert, the Eighth
Circuit determined that hearing one partner's claims prior to the dissolution,
winding up, and accounting of the partnership was proper where another
partner had violated an express stipulation in the partnership articles.
53 6
The Fourth Circuit drew an analogy between the provision for periodic
settlement of expenses in the mining partnership agreement in Gilbert and
the language of the indemnification provision at issue in IMWA Equities.
The latter, the Fourth Circuit opined, stipulated certain occurrences and
527. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.1 to -.77 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992).
528. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to -43 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992).
529. IMWA Equities IX Co. v. WBC Assocs., 961 F.2d 480, 482 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing
VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1991)).
530. 66 S.E. 822 (Va. 1910).
531. Summerson v. Donovan, 66 S.E. 822, 822 (Va. 1910).
532. See id. (holding that in cases where partnership agreements are clear as to sum partners
owe each other, general rule forbidding suits between copartners arising out of partnership
transactions before winding up and final settlement of accounts does not apply).
533. 22 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1927).
534. Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1927); see also Wright v. Armwood,
107 A.2d. 702, 703 (D.C. 1954) (reaffirming court's position that general rule against partner
suing another partner based on partnership transactions before winding up and final accounting
is subject to well-recognized exceptions).
535. Gilbert, 22 F.2d at 662.
536. Id.
19931
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circumstances which would give rise to IMWA's right to indemnification.
The court then concluded that because the partnership agreement expressly
indicated that upon Beacon Hill's default on an IMWA loan, WBC,
Wordsworth, and Borkin would indemnify IMWA for certain prescribed
amounts, Beacon Hill's partners had agreed that IMWA's right to indem-
nification would accrue prior to dissolution of the partnership. Holding that
IMWA did have an enforceable cause of action against its former partners,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.
The decision in IMWA Equities does not represent a significant depar-
ture from the views of most other courts that have passed upon similar
cases a.5 7 In IMWA Equities, the Fourth Circuit recognized the universally
accepted general common law rule that requires dissolution, winding up,
and final accounting of a partnership's affairs before an action between
partners based on the partnership agreement will lie. In so doing, the Fourth
Circuit was in accordance with earlier decisions of the United States Courts
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 538 the Second Circuit, 53 9 and the Eighth
Circuit. 540 While two states, Louisiana and Arizona, have in recent years
repudiated the common law rule barring copartners' actions at law arising
out of the partnership agreement until after a final settlement of partnership
accounts, 541 most state courts and the courts of the District of Columbia
continue to apply the rule.
542
The Fourth Circuit's acknowledgment that the rule is subject to excep-
tion also renders it consistent with the law in other jurisdictions.5 43 Thus,
537. Friedman v. Golden Arrow Films, Inc., 442 F.2d 1099, 1107-08 (2d Cir. 1971); Knapp
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 154 F.2d 395, 398 (10th Cir. 1946); Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l
Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 448, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 161 (1991); Michelsen v. Brush, 224 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Wright, 107
A.2d at 703; Gilbert, 22 F.2d at 662; Summerson v. Donovan, 66 S.E. 822, 822 (Va. 1910). But
see Sertich v. Moorman, 783 P.2d 1199, 1205 (Ariz. 1989) (eliminating requirement of final
accounting as condition precedent to action at law between partners or partner and partnership);
Dupuis v. Becnel Co., 535 So. 2d 375, 377-78 (La. 1988) (overruling prior cases that required
final accounting or settlement prior to suit between partners).
538. Knapp, 154 F.2d at 395.
539. Friedman, 442 F.2d at 1107-08.
540. Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1927).
541. Sertich, 783 P.2d at 1199; Dupuis, 535 So. 2d at 377-78.
542. See, e.g., Broadmoor Realty, Inc. v. First Nationwide Bank, 568 So. 2d 779, 782-83
(Ala. 1990) (holding that partner must seek accounting before commencing action against copartner
on matters growing out of partnership); Lawrence Street Partners, Ltd. v. Lawrence Street
Venturers, 786 P.2d 508, 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618,
649 (D.C. 1990) (same); RBC I, Inc. v. AJAR I, Inc., 519 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (same); Leonard v. Smieja, 366 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Bright
v. Angle, 833 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Thomas v. Marvin E. Jewell & Co.,
440 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Neb. 1989) (same); Related-Falls Bridge Ltd. Partnership v. Falls Bridge
Plaza Assocs., 575 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (App. Div. 1991) (same); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Cozad Const. Co., 745 P.2d 432, 434 (Or. App. 1987) (same); Burch v. Ashburn, 368 S.E.2d
82, 85 (S.C. 1988) (same); Biggs v. First Nat'l Bank, 808 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(same).
543. See Giblin v. Anesthesiology Assocs., 567 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (App. Div. 1991) (rec-
